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Prison Oversight and Prison 
Leadership 
 
Stan Stojkovic 
 
In a previous piece titled Correctional Leadership: A 
Cultural Perspective, my co-author and I identified the critical 
nexus between correctional leadership and organizational 
culture within prisons.1  Our purpose in that work was to show 
that correctional leadership mattered in how prisons were run.  
Moreover, we were interested in showing how a correctional 
culture could be created, one that recognized modern 
leadership and management practices and reflected the best 
values within the democratic tradition of the country.  In this 
brief piece, I will make a similar connection between prison 
oversight and prison leadership.  My thesis is that prison 
oversight matters when it comes to correctional leadership, and 
that it is in the best interests of everyone to have effective 
oversight mechanisms within our prison systems.  I will pursue 
this topic by examining three interrelated topics that highlight 
the importance and criticality of oversight mechanisms to 
prison leadership.  These three topics are: prison oversight and 
democratic values, prison oversight and prison effectiveness, 
and prison oversight and societal expectations.2 
Walter J. Dickey has noted the importance of prisons being 
run in a manner that is consistent with democratic ideals.3  
 
  Dean and Professor, Helen Bader School of Social Welfare, University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
1. STAN STOJKOVIC & MARY ANN FARKAS, CORRECTIONAL LEADERSHIP: A 
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2003). 
2. See Anne Owers, Prison Inspection and the Protection of Prisoners’ 
Rights, 30 PACE L. REV. 1535 (2010).  This revealing paper highlights the 
major differences between British and American ideas on oversight and is 
essential for those interested in prison oversight as a correctional 
management tool. 
3. The Management of Prisons in a Democratic Society: Written 
Testimony Before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 
Feb. 8, 2006 (statement of Walter J. Dickey, Professor & Senior Assoc. Dean 
for Academic Affairs, Univ. of Wis.), available at 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_4_witness_dickey_walter.  
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Having been a former director of a department of corrections, 
Dickey experienced the difficulties of leading and managing 
prisons under very austere circumstances.  All directors of 
departments of corrections operate public agencies, in the 
words of Michael Lipsky, with infinite expectations and finite 
resources.4  Addressing the multiple demands of institutional 
systems can be daunting, yet doing this within the context of 
public oversight and review makes things even more 
problematical.  For most correctional administrators, the 
balancing act of providing everything to everyone with limited 
resources has forced them to pursue a state of anonymity. 
What I mean by this is that anonymity is the preferred 
position when you cannot address what you need to address 
and where dollar limitations force you to either cut corners or 
evade mandates.  It is not a personal choice; it is more of an 
organizational choice, one imposed by reluctant legislators who 
see limited political utility in advocating for adequate resource 
allocations for prison systems.5  Moreover, the resource 
allocation question is invariably placed within the context of a 
public debate regarding what aims we want to pursue with 
prisons.  This question, more often than not, is not easily 
understood and answered.  The proverbial “public” wants 
everything, yet has a limited knowledge base from which to 
make informed choices about what are reasonable aims for 
prisons.6 
This is where oversight may be of assistance to prison 
officials.  In order to move from a state of anonymity to one of 
transparency, prison leaders will need to be convinced of its 
benefits.  In short, how will prison oversight assist prison 
 
4. MICHEAL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).   
5. Conversation with Judge William Wayne Justice at the Opening Up a 
Closed World: What Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight Conference, in 
Austin, Tex. (Apr. 23, 2006).  In addition, readers should know that Judge 
Justice was one of the leading judicial officials of the time (in the 1970s) in 
promoting change in prisons so that they met the legal requirements as 
promulgated by various federal and state laws.  Presiding over one of the 
most controversial cases in correctional legal history, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. 
Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), Judge Justice had experienced first-hand 
the recalcitrance of political officials to agree to manage constitutional 
prisons.    
6. See generally STAN STOJKOVIC & R. LOVELL, CORRECTIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1997). 
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leaders and managers to perform their basic functions more 
effectively and define their aims?  The state of anonymity is no 
longer possible for correctional officials given some of the issues 
that I will address later regarding democratic values, prison 
effectiveness, and societal expectations.  Additionally, in the 
21st century prison, the oversight function will be a new way of 
holding prison officials accountable.  This will be a new 
challenge for prison leaders and managers.  No longer will “out 
of sight, out of mind” be the norm for prisons.  Anonymity will 
become passé in the modern correctional system.  
Transparency and accountability will become normative as 
legislatures and some “publics” become more informed and 
demanding of prison leaders.  The confluence of democratic 
values, questions of prison effectiveness, and societal 
expectations will force transparency and oversight will be 
critical to not only how prisoners are treated, but in addition, to 
how prison leaders and managers are judged.  Prison 
leadership will become more salient and the degree to which 
oversight defines prison aims will be of tremendous assistance 
to beleaguered correctional administrators. 
 
Prison Oversight and Democratic Values 
 
Justice Louis Brandeis once stated that “[s]unlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants.”7  Such is the case with prisons.  
The prison is, for the most part, a public concern and requires 
public oversight.  I will not try to address the topic of prison 
privatization and its relationship to prison oversight, even 
though it is an important part of any prison oversight 
discussion.  Others have already addressed this topic 
thoroughly.8  In most countries, various forms of correctional 
privatization have been present over the past two hundred 
years.9  The question is how does prison oversight enhance 
 
7. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS 
USE IT 92 (On Demand Publishing 2009) (1914). 
8. See S. CAMP & D. DAGGETT, PRISON PRIVATIZATION: FINANCIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS, IN MANAGING SPECIAL POPULATIONS IN JAILS AND 
PRISONS (Stan Stojkovic, ed., 2d ed. 2010); Alfred C. Amen, Jr., Privatization, 
Prisons, Democracy and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of 
Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2005).  
9. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN 
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democratic values, and how are democratic values a 
constraining element when it comes to prison operations? 
These two questions reflect differing perspectives on prison 
oversight and democratic values.  The issue of prison 
transparency and attended democratic values are enhanced 
when we have effective prison oversight mechanisms in place.  
The objective is transparency, nothing more, nothing less.  The 
essence of democracy is that sunlight can get into institutional 
settings, especially those that have a history of being hidden.  
Operating from a position of transparency, prisons are seen 
with all their faults.  This awareness by itself is of value, but 
awareness without action is meaningless in the context of the 
prison.  Prison transparency allows for many opportunities for 
improvement to occur as well.  I once knew a prison warden 
who was a bit of a maverick when it came to public access.  He 
viewed the public as discrete entities with differential levels of 
power and influence.  He wanted the influential publics to have 
access to his prison.  These were persons and entities in the 
public who either controlled decision making in the legislature 
or had access to resources that could be directed to the prison.  
He viewed them as leveraging points to assist him in running 
the prison. 
This contrarian view (transparency) was viewed by many 
of the prison warden’s correctional colleagues as not only 
problematical but almost heretical.  He told me that the 
transparency allowed him to get to people “who mattered” and 
forced the state to do something about deplorable conditions in 
the prison.  By being anonymous, he was left in a defensive 
position vis-à-vis the courts.  This was a position that 
eventually led to failure at many levels.  His opposing 
viewpoint at the time did not engender many supporters, 
especially among his professional peers, and some in the 
legislature even labeled him as a “pain in the ass.” 
Notwithstanding the latter view of this warden, he was 
being a correctional leader.  He recognized that the old ways of 
doing business (circa, 1985!) were not working for him as a 
correctional leader.  He, in addition, defined correctional 
leadership as the ability to use democratic institutions to his 
benefit, not his detriment.  The courts, for example, were not 
 
WESTERN HISTORY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995). 
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the enemy.  They could be used to move a recalcitrant, and 
sometimes, defiant legislature to act.  A similar view was 
recently expressed by Reginald Wilkinson, the former Director 
of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, at a 
prison oversight conference.10  Mr. Wilkinson was able to use 
the courts positively to make effective changes in his 
department’s operations.  In effect, prison transparency, and in 
this case, the use of the courts and other relevant parties, had 
definite benefits for prison officials. 
Additionally, prison transparency serves to constrain 
prison officials.  In this way, the transparency allows outside 
people to see correctional operations and to comment on their 
appropriateness.  Often times, appropriateness is defined 
relative to some standard of conduct expected of prisons.  
Organizations like Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (“CPT”),11 the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”),12 the United Nations proclamations against 
torture,13 Amnesty International,14 and Human Rights Watch15 
all have expressed standards regarding codes of conduct for 
prisons.16  Again, a discussion on the aims of imprisonment 
becomes important here. 
 
10. Statement made at the Prison Oversight Conference, LBJ School of 
Government (Apr. 2006). 
11. See Council of Europe, About the CPT, 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
12. See ICRC, Strengthening Protection and Respect for Prisoners and 
Detainees, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/detention?opendocument&l
ink=home (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
13. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Convention Against 
Torture “Next Generation Treaty” that Places Value on Prevention Over 
Cure, Third Committee Told, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3955 (Oct. 20, 2009), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2009/gashc3955.doc.htm. 
14. See Amnesty International, Detention and Imprisonment, 
http://www.amnesty. org/en/detention (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
15. See David Fathi, Custody vs. Treatment Debate: Addicted to 
Punishment, HUM. RTS. WATCH, July 1, 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/01/custody-vs-treatment-debate-
addicted-punishment. 
16. See Michelle Deitch, Annotated Bibliography on Independent Prison 
Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1687 (2010).  These standards serve as minima 
criteria upon which prisoners are to be treated, yet unanimity on these 
standards is much more problematical.  Governments differ on what these 
standards are and how imprisonment is viewed. 
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For many countries, human rights standards are critical 
and the deprivation of liberty is taken very seriously.  In the 
United States, the importance of the deprivation of liberty has 
waned as a central value when assessing the aims of 
imprisonment.  This is ironic given the democratic traditions of 
the United States.  How did the deprivation of liberty issue 
become relegated to an unimportant issue within the political 
discussions of the United States regarding the aims of 
imprisonment?  This topic cannot be adequately addressed 
here.  Others, again, have examined this important question.17  
Typically, prison oversight meant litigation as the mechanism 
to force prisons to be accountable to the laws of the land, yet we 
have seen a massive retrenchment in the laws to hold prison 
officials accountable over the past ten years, largely due to the 
passing of legislation that limited prisoner access and prison 
oversight. 
As noted by S.F. Hanlon, the most significant piece of 
legislation that has limited prisoner access and prison 
oversight in the United States has been the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA).18  Passed under dubious circumstances 
and limited congressional debate, no other piece of legislation 
has altered the landscape of prison oversight in this country as 
much as the PLRA.  Not only did the PLRA limit prisoners’ 
abilities to litigate the conditions of their confinement, it also 
allowed prison administrators to evade their leadership 
responsibilities.  In my words, they could sustain a condition of 
anonymity when transparency was what they needed to 
adequately function.  Instead of speaking out against PLRA 
and other legislation that actually worked against their 
 
17. See, e.g., The Role of Litigation in Correctional Oversight: Written 
Testimony Before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 
Feb. 8, 2006 (statement of Alvin Bronstein, U.S. Bd. Member of Penal Reform 
Int’l (London)), available at 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/bronstein_alvin_j.pdf 
[hereinafter The Role of Litigation] (exploring the progression of civil rights 
and civil liberties in the post-World War II era).   
18. The Role of Litigation in Correctional Oversight: Written Testimony 
Before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, Feb. 9, 
2006 (statement of S.F. Hanlon, Partner, Holland & Knight), available at 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hanlon_stephen_f.pdf 
(discussing the impact of the PLRA on prison conditions).  See also Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 801, 110 Stat. 1321, 
1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/6
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correctional interests, prison leaders and managers were, for 
the most part, silent on these changes. 
The net effect has been that prisons have become less 
transparent and prison leaders, in many cases, have become 
less effective in what they do.  The benefits of transparency and 
prison oversight were lost during the 1990s, and when it comes 
to democratic values, there were no longer brakes being applied 
to correctional practices that harmed prisoners and citizens 
alike.19  Transparency, like other democratic values such as 
freedom and liberty, are not divisible.  You cannot be half-
transparent.  You are either transparent or you are not 
transparent.  Legislation in the 1980s and 1990s in America 
worked against not only prison oversight, but in addition, for 
the purposes of this paper, actually worked against the ability 
of correctional leaders to effectively lead.20  As a result, on 
many levels, American society became less democratic and 
correctional leaders and managers became less effective.  No 
effective prison oversight, with its requisite transparency, and 
no effective correctional leadership. 
 
Prison Oversight and Prison Effectiveness 
 
What are the aims of imprisonment in America?  The 
answer to this question has been discussed and debated for 
centuries.  The lack of consensus and some degree of unanimity 
has created both conceptual confusion and practical difficulties 
for the public and prison officials.  For the correctional 
administrator, the rule has always been: do what you have to 
do to maintain the prison.  This meant security, security, and 
more security.  Lofty notions of rehabilitation, effective 
intervention, and meaningful skill development among 
prisoners were given short shrift by correctional professionals, 
largely because they did not have a clue on how to achieve 
these aims.  Ironically, while the country was headed toward 
 
19. See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007). 
  20.  This legislation includes, for example, “Three Strikes and You’re Out 
Laws” and mandatory minimum laws, as well as a host of federal and state 
legislation designed to incarcerate drug offenders, beginning with the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, tit. I, subtitle A, Narcotics Penalties and 
Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. 
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an “imprisonment binge” through the 1980s, 1990s and into the 
21st century, social scientists were developing more knowledge 
about what interventions were efficacious with what 
prisoners.21 
At the same time, politicians were touting societal 
protection, deterrence, and retribution as the aims of 
imprisonment.  These latter aims led toward the largest lockup 
of men and women in our country’s history, replete with a 
myriad of unintended consequences, such as the 
disproportionate incarceration of people of color, especially 
African-American and Latino-American citizens.  Coupled with 
an ill-conceived “drug war,” the stage was set for the wholesale 
incarceration of millions of people.22  The United States has 
over 7.3 million people under correctional supervision, with 
over 2.3 million people incarcerated.23 
Moreover, the net effect of such a strategy was to make 
prison oversight more difficult.  As previously stated, under 
such strained conditions, correctional administrators have 
traditionally sought a position of anonymity.  Quite ironically, 
this view, again, actually made things worse.  Without 
adequate oversight, correctional problems compounded.  Issues 
like correctional health care, prison crowding, prison violence, 
and the management of prisons became almost impossible to 
address.  Correctional administrators, pursuing a position of 
anonymity, actually retreated behind their walls.  This is not 
the first time in correctional history that this has occurred.  
James B. Jacobs documented how perceived illegitimate 
intrusion by the courts in the 1960s and 1970s forced 
correctional professionals to retreat to the walls.  Feeling 
abandoned by society’s institutions, especially the courts, 
 
21. See Conversation with Edward Latessa, at the American Society of 
Criminology Meeting, in Ont., Can. (Nov. 22, 2005) (This conversation noted 
the growing body of evidence showing the importance of assessing offenders 
by their risk and need levels and matching them to appropriate 
interventions.).   
22. See JAMES AUSTIN & JOHN IRWIN, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA’S 
IMPRISONMENT BINGE 5, 7, 59 (3d ed. 2001).  This work, more than any other, 
makes a convincing claim that America’s penchant for incarcerating large 
numbers of people is misdirected, overly expensive, and counterproductive to 
any reasonable penal aims. 
23. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 6-7 (2008), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/6
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prison officials hid behind the walls and favored anonymity 
over transparency to address the perceived threat to their 
autonomy.24 
The modern day correctional leader has, for the most part, 
done the same thing.  He or she has pursued a strategy of 
anonymity at a time when transparency would be more 
beneficial.  Why is it more beneficial to pursue transparency 
over anonymity?  The answer to this question lies in prison 
effectiveness.  If we only expect prisons to feed, cloth, and 
watch-over prisoners for the length of their sentences, we 
cannot even say that this is being achieved.  I used to discuss 
with correctional administrators through the various training 
sessions I have given that if a prisoner came out of prison no 
worse than when he walked in we were successful.  Set aside 
this minimal aim, can we with certainty say this is even being 
achieved in many of our correctional institutions? 
If we answer this question honestly, I think we would 
conclude that prisons, on the dimension of effectiveness, have 
failed prisoners and society.  How is this tied to prison 
oversight?  The fact of the matter is that prison oversight can 
have tremendous benefit in allowing us to gain resources and 
bring to the table other actors who can assist in the 
management of prisons.  The nature of correctional problems, 
whether they are conceptual or practical, requires generating 
other perspectives for solutions.  Steven Luke has argued that 
many public problems require leadership that moves outside of 
a simple organizational domain.25  This is true of prisons given 
their stated aims.  Prison effectiveness will never be possible if 
we do not recognize this important fact. 
Prison oversight mechanisms provide correctional leaders 
and managers other ways to view their problems and aims.  I 
have stated in public hearings and before various legislative 
committees that the current prison suffers from too much 
tradition and very little innovation.  Unless there is change in 
how we understand correctional effectiveness and ways to 
 
24. JAMES B. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 
(1978).  This work is a classic in the penology literature and a must read for 
anyone interested in understanding the changing nature of incarceration in 
American society and how prison systems evolve. 
25. JEFFREY SCOTT LUKE, CATALYTIC LEADERSHIP: STRATEGIES FOR AN 
INTERCONNECTED WORLD (1998). 
9
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address it, prisons will continue to fail to achieve any aims, 
except being simply places of incapacitation.  Later in this 
paper I will show how this aim is unacceptable from a societal 
perspective.  For now, the contemporary prison has to redefine 
itself in a way that makes prison effectiveness possible.  Prison 
oversight mechanisms provide one opportunity for prisons to 
become more effective. 
 
Prison Oversight and Societal Expectations 
 
The shifting sands of public expectations for prisons can be 
a correctional administrators’ nightmare.  For many 
correctional professionals trying to figure out what the “public” 
wants or expects of prisons is as laborious as Sisyphus rolling 
the proverbial rock up the hill.  Nevertheless, I believe there 
are some core beliefs and values held by many in the various 
publics that should help correctional officials to see what 
societal expectations are regarding imprisonment.  These 
societal expectations are more varied and complicated than 
what is espoused by elected officials.  Many elected officials 
overstate the imprisonment aims of retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and societal protection when discussing public 
attitudes toward prisons.  The empirical reality is more 
complicated than expressed by many politicians.26  Imagine 
that! 
The evidence shows that most publics support the 
traditional aims of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
more recently societal protection, yet the mosaic of societal 
expectations for prisons is more diverse and rich and moves 
beyond these traditional aims.  In fact, the evidence indicates 
that most of the citizenry additionally expects prisons to do 
something with prisoners.  By this I mean promoting some type 
of change among prisoners so they do not return to prison.  I 
stated earlier that if one were honest, it is not clear that 
prisons do well in achieving the traditional aims of 
imprisonment.  How can we expect that they would fare any 
better in achieving a treatment or rehabilitation agenda with 
many prisoners, especially when the correctional history of 
America has been replete with examples of not only failure in 
 
26. See The Role of Litigation, supra note 17.   
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/6
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this area but abject failure, and in some cases, under the rubric 
of treatment, prisons have actually brutalized prisoners?27 
So, while there may be some publics who want more 
intervention and rehabilitation programming for prisoners, the 
evidence has been scant that correctional professionals actually 
can achieve such an aim.  Additionally, setting aside the 
epistemological question of the state of scientific knowledge on 
changing, for the most part, intractable prisoners, how do you 
in a practical sense make this happen?  I am always amazed 
when I look at some of our prisons and wonder how anything 
gets accomplished in them at all.  Take, for example, the 
California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California.  It is a 
prison hospital for all intents and purposes, serving thousands 
of prisoner patients.  Would you go to a hospital with three to 
five thousand other patients?  What type of medical coverage 
do you think you would receive? 
This is not to denigrate the excellent staff at this 
particular facility, but the fact of the matter is that we have 
structured a prison system in this country to fail in achieving 
many of its aims.  Notwithstanding some good scientific 
evidence that some treatment programs work well with some 
prisoners, a process of matching offenders to appropriate 
treatment interventions, the reality is that most correctional 
institutions are not staffed nor equipped to meet the treatment 
needs of prisoners.28  For most prisoners, prison serves as a 
respite from the harsh reality of the streets.  Many of them get 
no worse and many get no better in prison.  In prison, they get 
nothing! 
What is the role of prison oversight given these realities?  
By again, illuminating these realities, prison officials can work 
with prison oversight monitors to aid prisons on two levels.  
First, they can begin the long and difficult discussion of what 
we, as a society, can reasonably expect from prisons.  In this 
way, the prison oversight function provides debate within and 
 
27. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM 
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 18-20, 122, 388 (1st ed. 1980); 
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 86-89, 239, 287 (1st ed. 1971). 
28. See Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, From Nothing Works to 
What Works: Changing Professional Ideology in the 21st Century, 81 PRISON 
J. 313 (2001).  
11
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among the various publics regarding what reasonable 
expectations for prisons are.  This will be a difficult discussion 
since there are many interests that will seek to define this 
debate to their advantage.  For example, there could be private 
prison vendors who seek to define societal protection as the 
primary aim of imprisonment, with the net effect of more 
people being incarcerated.  In addition, political figures may 
want to define this discussion so as to highlight rehabilitative 
programming as part of a political agenda.  I faced this in one 
state when a former Secretary of the Department of 
Corrections sought my opinion on a name change of the 
department from the “Department of Corrections” to the 
“Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”  I did not 
support this proposed change.  My reasoning was that to 
believe that the Department of Corrections would be able to 
address the rehabilitative needs of tens of thousands of 
prisoners and parolees was an unrealistic expectation.  I held 
this view because the state was not able or willing to invest in 
the department in a way that would make the aim of prisoner 
rehabilitation possible.  Moreover, for most prisoners, the issue 
of personal change reaches well beyond the borders of prisons 
and includes family, friends, employment availability, 
educational opportunity, and a host of prisoner reentry issues.  
In short, the department cannot own the rehabilitative aim 
alone. 
By accepting the name change, the department was 
explicitly accepting the responsibility for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of offenders.  It could accept some of this 
responsibility, but not all of it.  Under current structural 
arrangements within the prison system, the department was 
being set up to fail, with its most ardent critics waiting to 
pounce when the department failed to achieve this aim.  Why 
own something, in totality, when the outcome rests with 
multiple societal institutions?  Prison oversight, however, can 
assist in the discussion about what prisons can reasonably 
accomplish and what they cannot reasonably accomplish.  
Additionally, the prison oversight function begins creating 
awareness among those relevant actors in the various publics 
that responsibility for achieving the aims of imprisonment 
rests with many societal institutions.  This awareness also 
begins the discussion about how prison aims will be addressed 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/6
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and what entities are responsible for the multitude of outcomes 
when assessing prison effectiveness. 
Second, prison oversight serves the purpose of defining 
societal expectations relative to legal and human rights 
standards.  Through prison oversight, we keep correctional 
leaders and managers on their toes.  Prison oversight serves to 
hold correctional officials accountable for their actions not only 
within the legal realm of society but within the moral realm as 
well.  This point was brought home in the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal and continues today regarding the operations of the 
detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.29  Questions of 
legality aside, the moral compass of the United States was 
clearly out of kilter with the expectation of its own citizens and 
other citizens of the world when the Abu Ghraib scandal broke.  
No reasonable person can accept the practices of the United 
States military or the Central Intelligence Agency in this case.  
It is only through oversight that such aberrant behaviors can 
be put in check.  In a democratic society, prison oversight 
provides the checks needed to control unyielding power, and 
without it we have fewer effective prisons and a less free 
society. 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
My purpose in this essay was to highlight the connection 
between prison oversight and prison effectiveness.  I showed 
this nexus by examining three important issues: prison 
oversight and democratic values, prison oversight and prison 
effectiveness, and prison oversight and societal expectations.  
The correctional leader and manager of the 21st century does 
not have the luxury of being anonymous.  A greater emphasis 
on democratic values, prison effectiveness, and societal 
expectations regarding imprisonment aims has forced prison 
officials to change how they lead and manage their prisons.  
 
29. Even though the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay is run by the 
United States Military, the importance of prison oversight is still relevant 
and important.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 631-35 (2006), that the U.S. military was in violation of 
international law and U.S. law and thus could not deny specific rights to 
detainees, most notably the right to be treated humanely in accord with 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.   
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The glue that ties these issues together is prison oversight.  
Prison oversight, in its varied forms, will be the norm for prison 
leadership and management in the 21st century prison. 
For correctional professionals, the only question remaining 
is how they will adjust to this change.  They can decide to fight 
oversight, but this is a losing battle for the reasons that I have 
explicated in this paper.  Instead, it is better that prison 
leaders and managers embrace the oversight function that best 
serves their interests.  I have tried to show that this involves 
greater transparency on the part of prison officials and that in 
the long run this will be in the best interest of improving prison 
effectiveness and maintaining the democratic values that we 
cherish as a society.  The challenges facing the prison 
administrator will be daunting in the years ahead.  With an 
effective prison oversight mechanism in place, these challenges 
will be better addressed to enhance the aims of imprisonment 
and to hold prison leaders and managers accountable to the 
democratic values of a free society. 
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